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Assessing the Net Effects of Specific Claims Settlements in First Nations Communities in the Context of Community Well-being

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Introduction

The historical relationship between the Crown and First Nations people in Canada is one of the most fundamental in Canada society; indeed, it has framed the context in which First Nations have developed across a broad spectrum of dimensions, including cultural, social, economic, and political. In certain instances, the legal obligations of Canada to First Nations people, rooted in historic treaties, the *Indian Act*, and other formal agreements, have failed to be met, with adverse consequences that are sometimes difficult to fully grasp and quantify. The specific claims process is one mechanism that has been designed to address outstanding grievances of First Nations people. Each specific claim addresses the unique historical relationship between the Crown and a specific First Nation (Butt and Hurley, 2006; Indian Affairs Canada, 2006). The scope of the claim can vary from improper management of First Nations funds, to failing to provide sufficient reserve land, to surrendering reserve lands in the absence of consent from a First Nation. Specific claims serve a few key purposes: improving the socio-economic well-being of communities and addressing historic injustices to build trust and foster cohesion between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians.[1]

The Problem and Scope of the Study

The purpose of this study is to develop and test a research design that will allow for a temporal assessment of the impact of specific claims and litigation on the overall well-being of First Nations communities. A research design was developed for assessing the impact that the claims and litigation process might have had on well-being as measured by the Community Well-being Index (CWB). The CWB is a composite index developed by the Strategic Research and Analysis Directorate of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) to measure selected elements of well-being across communities over time, using readily available indicators from the Canadian Census, as discussed in great detail in Chapter 6.

The project proceeded in five stages:

- **Stage 1**. We determined the quality, comparability, and availability of well-being indicators from Census Canada data over the Census periods of 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, and 2001.
- **Stage 2**. We gathered specific claims and litigation data from the departmental Specific Claims Branch (SCB) and Litigation Management and Resolution Branch (LMRB) databases from the inception of the databases to date.
- **Stage 3**. We categorized First Nation communities into relevant subcategories within the design, including those having submitted/filed a claim (or claims) that has resulted in a settlement; those with an ongoing claim; those communities that have not submitted/filed a claim; etc.
- **Stage 4**. We produced a research design that allowed for a comparison of those different types of communities to determine whether any temporal differences in well-being indicators are related to claims settlement.
- **Stage 5**. We assessed the design using the CWB with its four components: education, labour force, income, and housing.

Claims and Settlements: The Links to Socio-economic Development

Currently there are some 123 specific claims in negotiation in Canada. From 1973 to September 2006, 275 specific claims have been settled. The indemnity involved in the claims exceeds $5 billion.[2] It appears prima facie that legal settlements bring new resources to a community. Those resources may be in the form of dollars, mineral reserves, land, or access to previously blocked resources such as fish or forestry. New resources in free enterprise models should result in new economic development producing more overall wealth and prosperity. This prosperity, it seems logical to assume, should also result in greater employment and income as well as advancing social conditions and improving well-being. In this study, we examine this empirically, but there are indications in the research literature that these assumptions are not applicable in every case.

Gaming Windfalls in the US

Considerable controversy exists in the US over the economic activities that arose out of the tribal sovereignty rights that spawned both tax-free tobacco sales and gambling halls on reservations. From the high stakes bingos of Florida's Seminole Indians in the 1970s (Kersey, 1992), to the large-scale casino operations of the Capazon and Morongo bands in California, the courts upheld the rights of tribes to establish gaming on reservations—California versus Cabazon and Morongo Bands—(Snipp 1995). These decisions led to the proliferation of gaming as a revenue generator on Indian land.[3] Oregon, for example, has only one tribe without a casino (Darian-Smith 2004). The consequent results are mixed: "Those

Diagram 9.1: Status of Claims by Census Year



with successful operations are quick to point out the benefits ... better schools and improved public services" (Snipp 1995). However, as Darian-Smith (2004) points out, there are both successful and unsuccessful reservations.

These findings concur with the Harvard study led by Cornell and Kalt (1992). These researchers have been looking at the economic, political, and social development of a sample of Southwest US reservations. They have been trying to isolate the factors that either contribute to or block development. Generally, they reject standard economic theories that point to differential access to financial capital or different endowments of natural resources or human capital. They have compiled much anecdotal evidence that suggests that tribes with superior resources, such as the Crow of Montana, with billions in coal, have drastic social problems but tribes with fewer resources, such as the Cohiti Pueblo, are doing very well. They conclude that the one factor that sets socio-economic success in motion is the development of political institutions or what they call increased political sovereignty (Cornell and Kalt 1992). Whether this assessment is true is unsubstantiated, but for our purposes it is interesting to note that the mere existence of resources seems not to guarantee development and well-being. Having provided a brief overview of the potential contributions of claims to economic development in First Nations communities, we will now proceed with the analysis.

Analysis

Design

Essentially, the design used to measure the impact of specific claims on well-being consists of a series of before/after measures. The date of settlement of a community's first claim is used as the cut-point. Data on the outcome variable is observed before the settlement date and compared with outcome variable data after the settlement date. **Diagram 9.1** illustrates how this creates a step pattern of

before and after periods for the different groups of communities. Some communities, of course, have no settlements.

As can be seen from this diagram, communities that had a settlement in 2001 have no "after" observations for comparison. Similarly, communities that settled in 1981 have no "before" observations. Those that settled in 1991 have a ten-year period of before and after observations.

One of the limiting factors underlying this study was our inability to identify the year in which the claim was filed. Consequently, it is difficult to fully assess the impact that the process of filing a claim, regardless of outcome, might have had on the community.

Data

There are two basic sources of data for this study. The first source of data consists of the decennial and quinquennial census estimates generated by Statistics Canada between 1981 and 2001 for the calculation of the CWB. The second source of data consists of specific claims that were either initiated or settled prior to December 31, 2003. Those data were obtained from the Specific Claims Branch of INAC. Both data bases have issues surrounding them; consequently, we will discuss each separately.

Census Data and the CWB

This analysis uses the CWB, which utilizes Census data over the 1981–2001 period[4] to document well-being trends for First Nations communities. The limitations of the Census data in constructing the CWB have been described in great detail elsewhere (Chapter 6), but for the sake of convenience, we will highlight the key issues that are particularly relevant for this study.

Data at the CSD (Census subdivision) level were used to develop CWB scores for First Nations communities. CSD level data are appropriate since this unit of analysis generally corresponds closely with both the legal and conventional definition of a community. Most First Nations communities (reserves) can be identified by a single CSD. One key problem we face involves matching CSDs over sequential Census periods. In order to legitimately compare a community across time, one must be sure that one is assessing the same entity. Fortunately for analysis purposes, most First Nations communities remain geographically stable and the Statistics Canada CSD identifier code remains consistent over the period of investigation. There are, however, numerous exceptions to this rule: new reserves are created; some reserve lands are split and new CSD identifiers are assigned; some areas amalgamate; and, occasionally, some reserves become unpopulated. To take these issues into account the CWB excludes communities deemed "inconsistent entities" across time.

Perhaps the most important issue related to any use of Census data in examining the First Nation population, including the CWB, is *under enumeration* Many communities have been under enumerated in recent Censuses due to political

Diagram 9.2: Range of Claims by Census Year



tensions between some communities and the federal government.[5] Consequently, it is common to have data on a community in, for example, 1981, 1991, and 2001 but not in 1986 or 1996. The under enumeration problem remained insurmountable. Its scope is also such that we must impose strong reservations on the results generated by this analysis. As will be discussed in the conclusions, we would strongly suggest that any future analysis take a different approach to assessing the impact of claims and claims settlements on the communities in question.

Thus, CWB scores between 1981 and 2001 are based upon the following criteria:

- The CSD existed in each Census year.
- The CSD did not gain or lose more than 5% of its population.
- The CSD had a CWB score in each Census year.
- The CSD had a population of at least 65 in each Census year.

Claims Data

Data on both opened and settled claims were supplied by the Specific Claims Branch of INAC. The data file contained information on claims by band, filed and settled between 1971 and 2003, inclusive. In order to match the claims data to the CWB data, we aggregated the claims data into five-year intervals. For example, since a Census was conducted in 1986, claims data for the period were aggregated between the years 1984 and 1988 inclusive and identified as a 1986 data point. The overall pattern is illustrated in **Diagram 9.2** where the claims data for the years 1984 to 1988 are aggregated about the 1986 census period. If a community filed or settled a claim within that period, a flag was set within the database.

In some cases, more than one claim was filed or settled within each five-year period. That pattern increased with time, but the flag was based on an "all or nothing" outcome. As a result, three types of communities were identified: those with no claim (either settled or filed); those with a claim filed but not settled; and, those with a settled claim within that period. Some communities also had claims filed or settled across more than one Census period. Where several claims were settled within a five-year period, the aggregate dollar amount of those claims was calculated in constant dollars.

Figure 9.1: Community Well-being Scores for Communities With No Claims: 1981–2001



Figure 9.2: Community Well-being Scores for Communities That Have Ever Settled a Claim: 1981–2001



Figure 9.3 Community Well-being Scores for Communities With a Field Claim but No Settlement: 1981–2001



One group of claims that was excluded consisted of those settled at the tribal or council level. The difficulty with claims at the tribal council level is that it is not clear which, if any, of the constituent communities might have been actively involved or might have actively benefited from the claims action.

As indicated in the discussion of the CWB data, matching the claims data to the CWB data proved difficult in some instances due to the under enumeration problem. For several communities, we know that a claim was filed or resolved, but it is impossible to assess the impact of that action within the current framework because the characteristics of the community, as operationalized by the CWB, were not available.

Outcome Indicator: The Community Well-being Index (CWB)

As discussed previously, successful claims settlements by First Nation communities are thought to be one avenue through which well-being could be improved. Choosing appropriate outcome indicators that are sensitive to changes resulting from these settlements is important if one seeks to assess their full impact.

For the past several years, the Strategic Research and Analysis Directorate at INAC has been researching the notion of well-being in First Nations communities. One of the fruits of this endeavour has been the creation of the Community Well-Being Index (CWB). The CWB is a useful tool that captures socio-economic well-being through the use of several relevant indicators. A score is generated for each First Nation community[6] which provides a snapshot of its well-being. CWB scores range between zero and one, with higher numbers indicating greater well-being. The index, which measures four equally weighted components—education, housing, income, and employment—uses Census data to track the well-being of Canadian First Nation communities over time (see Chapter 6). Thus, for the purposes of the research question at hand, this measure provides us with a way to assess the likely impact of claims initiation/settlement on well-being, as defined by this index.

Statistical Analysis

Several approaches were taken to the analysis of the data. Essentially, we looked for two things: aggregate before and after differences, and differences in secular or temporal trends. Simple before/after analyses provide limited information since it is not clear that any difference is due to the settlement "intervention" or to external on-going processes. By comparing groups of communities with staggered settlement dates, however, it is possible to separate out the potential impact of the settlement interventions from other temporal trends.

Applying several standard general linear model procedures (e.g., analysis of variance based on before/after effects, interrupted analysis of covariance) produced similar results. **Figures 9.1**, **9.2**, and **9.3** show the overall basic temporal patterns of CWB scores and components for the three different groups—"no claims," "settled

Figure 9.4: Community Well-being Scores for Communities With Claims Settled in 1981: 1981–2001



Figure 9.5: Community Well-being Scores for Communities With Claims Settled in 1986: 1981–2001



Figure 9.6: Community Well-being Scores for Communities With Claims Settled in 1991: 1981–2001



a claim," and "filed a claim but no settlement"—from 1981 to 2001. Overall, the CWB and component scores tend to increase over time; however, across the three different groups there is no significant difference in the magnitude of the changes of each group over the 1981–2001 period, as indicated by the massive overlap in 95% confidence intervals. In other words, every group increased their CWB score by a similar amount over time[7] and there are no systematic differences in the CWB across the different groups.

Figures 9.4 to **9.8** (pages 192 & 194) illustrate the period over period differences from 1981 to 2001 and the 95% confidence intervals for those differences within the group "settled a claim," in terms of CWB and components scores, by year of settlement.[8] As indicated by the overlap in confidence intervals, there are no systematic changes in the outcome variables over time across the groups of communities. For the most part, the difference in CWB and component scores from Census to Census, regardless of the year in which the claim was settled, do not appear to be systematically significant when compared to changes in the groups "no claims" and "filed a claim but no settlement" over the same time periods. In other words, having a settled claim does not seem to increase the CWB scores any more than one observes in the other two groups ("no claims" and "claims but no settlements").

Conclusions and Future Directions

Based on the current analysis, it is not possible to identify a significant linkage between the claims process and the outcome measure used. We offer several explanations for the null findings below and emphasize that they do not necessarily mean that specific claims settlements did not impact on well-being. An alternative methodological approach is recommended given the problems with the existing study.

Validity Issue

The absence of an effect of specific claims settlements on well-being could be a product of the very limited number of potential impact factors that we have been able to examine. While the existing literature and conventional wisdom suggest that the variables we examined are reasonable candidates,[9] there are major bodies of literature that would have us look elsewhere (e.g., The Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, 1996). The CWB may indeed be an insensitive indicator of the benefits accruing to communities from claims. Given its socio-economic focus, changes in the physical, political, psychological, and cultural milieu, as well as the social capital and cohesion of communities, are not examined. There may also be benefits to more tangible measures such as lower rates of suicide or substance abuse. Unfortunately, the Census does not include any of those indicators within its orbit. These issues appear relevant given previous research. For example, in his examination of development outcomes of the Meadow Lake Tribal Council during 1986

Figure 9.7: Community Well-being Scores for Communities With Claims Settled in 1996: 1981–2001



Figure 9.8: Community Well-being Scores for Communities With Claims Settled in 2001: 1981-2001



to 1996, Anderson (2002) reveals that the people of the Meadow Lake First Nations in northwestern Saskatchewan were pleased with the increase in employment and business activity resulting from forestry, but many were dissatisfied with the clear cutting process and its effects on their ability to continue traditional practices, as well as the lack of influence with respect to operating decisions. Thus, this would indicate that socio-economic development must be considered in the context of traditional values and control over development activities. Similarly, studies by Anderson and Bone (1999) and Anderson (2002) claim that the First Nations approach to economic development includes the following purposes: improvement of socio-economic circumstances; greater control of activities on their traditional lands; attainment of economic self-sufficiency in support of self government; and the preservation and strengthening of traditional culture, values, and languages, and their application in economic development and business activities. These features of economic development echo the Royal Commission on Aboriginal People (1996). Our indicators are insensitive to much of these notions

of socio-economic development. Moreover, the socio-economic indicators of the CWB provides an incomplete snapshot of the situation in First Nation communities, as many Aboriginal people engage in traditional activities such as hunting and fishing, which contributes to well-being but fails to be captured in Census measures.

On another note, perhaps the most important shortcoming of this research on the effects of specific claims on well-being is the inability to test the extent to which they enhance trust and understanding, as well as promote cohesiveness and partnerships, between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people of Canada. In fact, the extent to which the resolution of grievances has resulted in the perception of justice being served in the eyes of stakeholders is a central goal of the claims process, but is not captured in this analysis due to a lack of data.

N Size

Another possible reason for the null effects of specific claims on well-being is related to the "n" size of the data. Specifically, even if the measures we used have been influenced by the claims process, we face the problem of small numbers over time. While the aggregate number of claims filed and claims settled is technically sufficient to detect a significant impact, the reduced numbers due to Census under enumeration pose a major obstacle. In technical terms, under enumeration can lead to sample selection bias and to statistical power problems. Sample selection bias would result from those communities not participating in the Census being systematically different on the selected indicators from those communities that remain in the Census process. It is certainly conceivable that the more "successful" or more newly resourced communities might take a more aggressive stand against the census takers and refuse to cooperate. The statistical power problem results from there simply being too few communities to allow us to detect a statistically significant difference. This is particularly problematic when the effects that we are looking for evolve gradually or manifest themselves in a subtle manner.

Utilization of Specific Claims Settlements

The manner in which claims settlements are utilized by a community may play a role in determining whether any effects are observed. It would be worthwhile to see whether any transfers made to the communities were used simply on consumption or were invested in community resources. Distributed settlements where each band member receives x dollars could have a positive impact on the community, but a very diffuse one that is not sensitive to detection by the CWB index. For example, band members might use distributed funds to fix or decorate their homes, buy a new car, or simply spend the funds on food, clothing, and other consumables, which may largely contribute little to increasing income, housing, education, or labour force indicators. On the other hand, communities that retain the aggregate settlement and use it as a source of capital would be more likely to produce a focused outcome by building a better school, stimulating

employment, improving the overall quality of band housing, and developing sustainable infrastructure to spawn overall socio-economic development.[10] Tracking how the funds are distributed requires additional research.

Settlement Size and Temporal Issues

We expect that the size of a settlement would largely influence the magnitude of change one would expect to observe in outcome indicators of well-being. In the analysis at hand, the size of the settlements varies considerably. Although some of the more recent settlements go into the several million dollar ranges, many settlements are for a relatively inconsequential amount. Sample selection bias and statistical power problems due to missing data make an analysis of the dollar impact difficult. It is likely that depending upon the amount of the claims settlement and how the capital is used (e.g., dispersed to individuals versus infrastructure to enhance educational attainment) it may be unrealistic to expect any detectable change in the outcome.

In terms of temporality, the resources obtained from the settlement of a specific claim would unlikely result in any instantaneous change in outcome indicators of well-being. In fact, the flow of resources and the returns to long-term strategic investments require time to fully manifest themselves. The exact time period is uncertain, but may be influenced by the existing capacity of the community, including cohesion, geography, demographics, and existing human, social, financial/natural capital.[11, 12] Moreover, the type of investment and outcome expected will dictate the length of time before an effect is observed. Furthermore, it is plausible that there is a threshold effect, where a claim must be of a certain value to have any detectable/significant effect on the outcome variables measured. Given these other factors, delineating the effects of claims on well-being is a complex task on which we are continuing to work diligently.

In sum, we would suggest that the reader be cautious in over interpreting these findings. We feel it is not suggested that specific claims settlements have no effect on well-being. We would say that the data suggests that any community impacts are likely to occur over the long term, and if they are to be positive, it would demand that the settlements be invested into the community in ways that will encourage educational and socio-economic improvements. Further research would be useful to determine how these particular mechanisms might work.

Conclusion

This work sought to test the effects of claims on community well-being, and to develop a way to systematically accomplish this task using socio-economic indicators that are readily available in the Census. Our approach is a cost-effective manner of examining temporal changes, and the generalizability of results is directly of benefit to all stakeholders. As we noted above, the problem we face

here is that the results of this work are less than definitive, given the time span of the data and the limited availability of relevant outcomes of the claims settlements.

If future studies were to take place, we would recommend that a detailed case study approach be adopted in conjunction with the aggregate statistical analysis. This approach could mitigate some of the difficulties faced by the aggregate statistical approach taken here, given a case study's holistic and in-depth analytical framework. As well, we would suggest waiting until more time has elapsed so that more post-settlement data would be available. This would allow a finer-tuned assessment of the effect of the settlements on well-being. We realize that using a case study approach creates a tradeoff between specificity and generalizability.[13] However, such a study would allow us to draw some understanding of how settlements are being used in the communities. We could then proceed to see if there are any potential relationships between how settlements are used and their impact on a specific community's well-being. Combining this understanding with a longer time frame might allow us to interpret the aggregate data more finely. On the one hand, from a policy perspective, individual community accounts are limited in terms of what they represent—are the events and conditions of a specific community typical of First Nations communities that have received claims? On the other hand, this approach tends to capture a part of what is missed through survey methodology that only utilizes Census data. As discussed earlier, if socio-economic success must be defined as a multidimensional concept that includes traditional socio-economic indicators as well as governance, cohesion, culture, tradition, and other social processes absent from the Census, it may be essential to use multiple investigation methods to capture these themes.[14, 15, 16]

In closing, the issue of the effects of claims and litigation on the well-being of First Nations people is a crucial one, with significant implications for all stakeholders. While it is troubling that we were unable to find a positive effect of specific claims settlements on well-being, this work is one piece of the puzzle; we have outlined the difficulties in assessing such a complex relationship and offered some key points to consider. We will continue to monitor and examine this relationship using different methodological approaches and shed more light on this cardinal issue.

Endnotes

1 For a detailed account of the history of specific claims and the relationship between the Crown and First Nations, see Butt and Hurley (2006) and the specific claims website at <**www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ps/clm/index_e.html**>.

2 See the specific claims website for more details: <**www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ps/clm/scb-eng.asp**>. Also, see White, Maxim, and Spence (2004) for more information on the link between the legal framework of society and the structuring of relations in society, including socio-economic development and overall well-being.

3 It should be noted that there has been legislation passed that limits Indian gaming operations. The *Indian Gaming Regulatory Act* (National Indian Gaming Commission 1988), for example, restricts gaming on reservations to roughly the level of gaming allowed in the state where the reservation is found. Tribes must negotiate with their home state if they want Las Vegas–style (Class III) gaming (Darian-Smith 2004).

4 There are no CWB scores for 1986 because of differences in the manner in which relevant variables were measured in the Census, coupled with the large number of First Nation communities that did not participate.

5 For example, thirty First Nation communities, including about 30,000–35,000 Registered Indians, chose not to participate in the 2001 Census.

6 Excluding communities that did not participate in the Census, had data quality issues, or had populations of less than 65.

7 Accompanying the graphical descriptions of the results presented in the figures are tables with "n" sizes, averages, and standard errors, which can be found in Appendix 1.

8 Accompanying the graphical descriptions of the results presented in the figures are tables with "n" sizes, averages, and standard errors, which can be found in Appendix 2.

9 For a detailed discussion on the CWB, including validity and reliability issues, see Chapters 2 & 6.

10 On the one hand, if the resources are allocated in a diverse manner towards various needs of the community, many small positive changes may occur across each of the outcomes of interest, but no single outcome may improve in a significant manner. On the other hand, where resources are allocated exclusively for improving an outcome of interest, for example educational attainment, we may be more likely to observe a change in the outcome of interest.

11 For example, White, Spence, and Maxim (2005) found that social capital has a positive effect on educational attainment in First Nations communities, but the relationship is an interactive one, contingent upon community norms, cultural openness, and community capacity. Thus, increasing educational attainment from claims settlements using this social capital framework may be the primary objective; however, for this goal to be achieved there is a critical period in which resources will take time to flow in, contributing to the preconditions necessary for maximizing social capital for educational purposes for a specific community. This period may be several years and will likely vary by community, given existing conditions.

12 For an in-depth examination of how these issues relate to economic development, see *Aboriginal Conditions: Research as a Foundation for Public Policy* (White, Maxim, and Beavon, 2002).

13 See Yin (1984) for more on the debate regarding case study research and generalizability.

14 One of the hallmarks of case study methodology is that it is a multiple perspective analysis which gives voice to the powerless (Feagin, Orum, and Sjoberg, 1991). This point is particularly relevant given the historical treatment of First Nations people in Canada.

15 Given the diversity of First Nations people, culturally, historically, and socio-economically (e.g., Young, 2003; Waldram, Herring, and Young, 1995), as well as the specific historical relationship between the Crown and each First Nation with a grievance, it may in fact be absolutely necessary to use the case study approach to truly understand the (non) effects of specific claims.

16 For an in depth examination of case study methodology, see Feagin, Orum, and Sjoberg (1991), Stoke (1995) and Yin (1984; 1994).

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Appendix 1

Appendix 1A: Community Well-being and Component Scores for Communities with No Claims: 1981–2001

Income					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.3660	0.0201	0.3266	0.4053	62
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.4140	0.0167	0.3813	0.4467	72
1996	0.4507	0.0151	0.4200	0.4802	76
2001	0.4619	0.0156	0.4312	0.4926	78
Housing					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.5750	0.0241	0.5278	0.6223	62
1986	-	-			
1991	0.6267	0.0175	0.5924	0.6609	72
1996	0.6666	0.0149	0.6374	0.6958	76
2001	0.6806	0.0153	0.6506	0.7106	78
CWB Score					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.5021	0.0123	0.4780	0.5263	62
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.5631	0.0109	0.5417	0.5845	72
1996	0.6138	0.0092	0.5957	0.6318	76
2001	0.6334	0.0093	0.6152	0.6515	78
Education					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.4091	0.0221	0.3657	0.4525	62
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.5284	0.0184	0.4923	0.5645	72
1996	0.6204	0.0163	0.5884	0.6524	76
2001	0.6483	0.0188	0.6115	0.6851	78
Labour Force Activity					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.6528	0.0178	0.6179	0.6878	62
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.6534	0.0121	0.6296	0.6771	72
1996	0.6907	0.0112	0.6687	0.7126	76
2001	0.6903	0.0098	0.6711	0.7095	78

Appendix 1B: Community Well-being and Component Scores for those Communities That Have Ever Settled a Claim

Income					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.3508	0.0210	0.3096	0.3919	58
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.3811	0.0174	0.3471	0.4152	62
1996	0.4139	0.0161	0.3823	0.4456	72
2001	0.4465	0.0157	0.4156	0.4774	75
Housing					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.6255	0.0232	0.5801	0.6710	58
1986	-	-			
1991	0.6309	0.0231	0.5856	0.6763	62
1996	0.6846	0.0177	0.6499	0.7193	72
2001	0.6835	0.0176	0.6490	0.7180	75
CWB Score					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.5184	0.0124	0.4940	0.5428	58
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.5619	0.0123	0.5378	0.5860	62
1996	0.5999	0.0117	0.5769	0.6230	72
2001	0.6282	0.0102	0.6083	0.6481	75
Education					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.4209	0.0217	0.3784	0.4635	58
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.5575	0.0180	0.5222	0.5929	62
1996	0.6364	0.0148	0.6074	0.6655	72
2001	0.6980	0.0118	0.6749	0.7212	75
Labour Force Activity					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.6778	0.0154	0.6477	0.7080	58
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.6251	0.0104	0.6046	0.6456	62
1996	0.6661	0.0102	0.6462	0.6861	72
2001	0.6720	0.0092	0.6539	0.6901	75

Appendix 1C: Community Well-being and Component Scores for Those Communities with a Filed Claim but no Settlement: 1981–2001

Income					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.3823	0.0132	0.3564	0.4082	137
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.4295	0.0096	0.4107	0.4904	156
1996	0.4708	0.0100	0.4512	0.4904	162
2001	0.4921	0.0094	0.4736	0.5106	175
Housing					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.6033	0.0164	0.5710	0.6355	137
1986	-	-			
1991	0.6849	0.0115	0.6624	0.7073	156
1996	0.7350	0.0108	0.7138	0.7561	162
2001	0.7297	0.0101	0.7099	0.7494	175
CWB Score					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.5378	0.0074	0.5233	0.5522	137
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.6058	0.0063	0.5934	0.6182	156
1996	0.6496	0.0057	0.6383	0.6608	162
2001	0.6662	0.0056	0.6552	0.6771	175
Education					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.4532	0.0113	0.4311	0.4753	137
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.5837	0.0105	0.5630	0.6043	156
1996	0.6647	0.0097	0.6457	0.6837	162
2001	0.7036	0.0090	0.6861	0.7212	175
Labour Force Activity					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.6638	0.0092	0.6458	0.6819	137
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.6407	0.0067	0.6275	0.6538	156
1996	0.6851	0.0064	0.6725	0.6977	162
2001	0.7012	0.0058	0.6898	0.7126	175

Appendix 2

Appendix 2A: Community Well-being and Component Scores for those Communities With Claims Settled in 1981: 1981–2001

Income					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.5068	0.0939	0.3228	0.6909	5
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.5024	0.0951	0.3160	0.6887	5
1996	0.5253	0.0729	0.3824	0.6682	6
2001	0.5565	0.0814	0.3969	0.7160	5
Housing					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.7365	0.1268	0.4879	0.9851	5
1986	-	-			
1991	0.7483	0.1245	0.5043	0.9922	5
1996	0.7791	0.0926	0.5976	0.9607	6
2001	0.8016	0.1004	0.6047	0.9984	5
CWB Score					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.5684	0.0812	0.4092	0.7275	5
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.6231	0.0707	0.4845	0.7616	5
1996	0.6661	0.0576	0.5532	0.7790	6
2001	0.6739	0.0544	0.5671	0.7806	5
Education					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.5333	0.1096	0.3184	0.7482	5
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.6111	0.1013	0.4125	0.8096	5
1996	0.7036	0.0584	0.5892	0.8180	6
2001	0.7266	0.0644	0.6003	0.8528	5
Labour Force Activity					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.6738	0.0371	0.6011	0.7465	5
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.6103	0.0402	0.5315	0.6892	5
1996	0.6564	0.313	0.5951	0.7176	6
2001	0.6266	0.0426	0.5437	0.7094	5

Appendix 2B: Community Well-being and Component Scores for those Communities With Claims Settled in 1986: 1981–2001

Income					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.4073	0.0973	0.2165	0.5980	4
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.4465	0.0402	0.3677	0.5253	5
1996	0.4603	0.0457	0.3707	0.5499	4
2001	0.4753	0.0255	0.4253	0.5253	4
Housing					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.6511	0.1380	0.3807	0.9216	4
1986	-	-			
1991	0.6573	0.0632	0.5334	0.7812	5
1996	0.7223	0.0322	0.6593	0.7854	4
2001	0.6318	0.0510	0.5319	0.7317	4
CWB Score					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.5693	0.0752	0.4218	0.7168	4
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.5995	0.0538	0.4940	0.7049	5
1996	0.6509	0.0332	0.5858	0.7160	4
2001	0.6486	0.0305	0.5889	0.7084	4
Education					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.4283	0.1196	0.1938	0.6627	4
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.6097	0.0931	0.4272	0.7922	5
1996	0.6511	0.0993	0.4564	0.8458	4
2001	0.7126	0.0701	0.5753	0.8499	4
Labour Force Activity					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.7227	0.0520	0.6208	0.8246	4
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.6843	0.0350	0.6157	0.7529	5
1996	0.6985	0.0144	0.6704	0.7267	4
2001	0.7245	0.0178	0.6897	0.7593	4

Appendix 2C: Community Well-being and Component Scores for Those Communities with Claims Settled in 1991: 1981–2001

Income					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.3273	0.0331	0.2625	0.3921	24
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.3392	0.0255	0.2893	0.3891	26
1996	0.3599	0.0215	0.3177	0.4020	29
2001	0.3980	0.0212	0.3565	0.4395	32
Housing					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.5932	0.0337	0.5271	0.6593	24
1986	-	-			
1991	0.5801	0.0334	0.5146	0.6456	26
1996	0.6557	0.0250	0.6067	0.7046	29
2001	0.6517	0.0255	0.6018	0.7016	32
CWB Score					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.5075	0.0163	0.4754	0.5395	24
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.5301	0.0180	0.4947	0.5654	26
1996	0.5739	0.0173	0.5400	0.6078	29
2001	0.6046	0.0255	0.6018	0.7016	32
Education					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.3888	0.0319	0.3263	0.4513	24
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.5334	0.0239	0.4866	0.5801	26
1996	0.6073	0.0221	0.5640	0.6506	29
2001	0.6963	0.0128	0.6713	0.7214	32
Labour Force Activity					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.6865	0.0218	0.6438	0.7293	24
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.6071	0.0148	0.5781	0.6361	26
1996	0.6408	0.0146	0.6121	0.6695	29
2001	0.6495	0.0102	0.6295	0.6696	32

Appendix 2D: Community Well-being and Component Scores for Those Communities with Claims Settled in 1996: 1981–2001

Income					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.3546	0.0372	0.2817	0.4275	21
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.3991	0.0247	0.3508	0.4474	25
1996	0.4343	0.0234	0.3885	0.4801	28
2001	0.4740	0.0217	0.4315	0.5166	28
Housing					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.6548	0.0395	0.5774	0.7321	21
1986	-	-			
1991	0.6642	0.0353	0.5951	0.7334	25
1996	0.6890	0.0303	0.6295	0.7485	28
2001	0.7091	0.0288	0.6528	0.7655	28
CWB Score					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.5310	0.0220	0.4879	0.5741	21
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.5892	0.0185	0.5529	0.6256	25
1996	0.6211	0.0182	0.5853	0.6568	28
2001	0.6519	0.0161	0.6204	0.6834	28
Education					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.4539	0.0337	0.3878	0.5200	21
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.5870	0.0249	0.5383	0.6358	25
1996	0.6697	0.0182	0.6339	0.7054	28
2001	0.7166	0.0179	0.6815	0.7516	28
Labour Force Activity					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.6665	0.0289	0.6098	0.7232	21
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.6359	0.0147	0.6071	0.6646	25
1996	0.6805	0.0149	0.6513	0.7097	28
2001	0.6958	0.0149	0.6666	0.7250	28

Appendix 2E: Community Well-being and Component Scores for Those Communities with Claims Settled in 2001: 1981–2001

Income					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.3620	0.0349	0.2935	0.4305	15
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.3676	0.0457	0.2780	0.4573	14
1996	0.4313	0.0410	0.3509	0.5118	17
2001	0.4593	0.0400	0.3809	0.5377	18
Housing					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.6621	0.0353	0.5929	0.7314	15
1986	-	-			
1991	0.6552	0.0457	0.5655	0.7448	14
1996	0.7134	0.0356	0.6436	0.7831	17
2001	0.7037	0.0342	0.6368	0.7707	18
CWB Score					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.5230	0.0236	0.4767	0.5693	15
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.5620	0.0260	0.5110	0.6129	14
1996	0.6021	0.0268	0.5496	0.6546	17
2001	0.6293	0.0247	0.5809	0.6776	18
Education					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.4182	0.0347	0.3503	0.4861	15
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.5659	0.0365	0.4943	0.6374	14
1996	0.6514	0.0330	0.5867	0.7161	17
2001	0.6883	0.0307	0.6282	0.7483	18
Labour Force Activity					
Year	*Average*	*Standard Error*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*n*
1981	0.7051	0.0274	0.6515	0.7588	15
1986	-	-			-
1991	0.6378	0.0269	0.5850	0.6905	14
1996	0.6877	0.0245	0.6397	0.7358	17
2001	0.6901	0.0216	0.6478	0.7323	18